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ABSTRACT
Unsupported brand evaluation thoughts are frequently
reported by subjects in cognitive response studies of persuasion.
Common practice has been to inc]ude these thoughts in indices of
counter/support argumentation, and treat them as mediators of
communication effects or attitude. Wright (1974, 1980) has argued
that brand evaluation thoughts provide a naturally occur ing
measure of attitude, and herce should not be treated as mediators
of advertising effects on attitude. This proposition, and a
second related one was tested in an advertising experiment.
Neither received any empirical support. Implications for
cognitive response research in general, and for future research
on the rcJe of brand evaluation thoughts in persuasion are
discussed
.

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, persuasion researchers in Psychology and
Marketing have increasingly adopted a cognitive response approach
for monitoring communication effects en the receiver (Greenvrald
1968; bright ]973, 1980; Petty, Ostrcm and Frock 1981; CI son, Toy
and Dover 1982). In this approach, spontaneous thoughts (i.e;
cognitive responses) generated by the receiver during ad exposure
are hypothesized to be the causal mediators of ad effects en
brand attitice, and other related elements of cognitive structure
( e.g; attribute beliefs, and behavioral intentions). Cognitive
responses are usually measured either during, or immediately
after ad exposure by asking subjects to verbalize or v;rite down
the thoughts they had as they viewed the advertisement. These
reported thougts are then classified into one. of several
predetermined categories by tie subjects themselves, or by a
panel of judges. Some subset of these categories is then chosen
for further analysis, and the number of thoughts in each chosen
catagory are related to measures of brand attitude and, less
frequently, to belief and behavioral intention measures.
The choice of a catagor iza ticn scheme rests primarily with the
individual researcher, and depends on the mediation processes
under investigation. For the most part, rese ate hers have focussed
attention on two types, or categories of cognitive responses --
courterarguements (CA) , and support arguments (£A). ( See Wright
1980 for a detailed discussion of alternative categorization
schemes). CA and SA represent (respectively) negative and
positive thoughts about the advertised brand, and/or seme
specific claim about the brand made ir. the advertisement. There
is g roving evidence that CA and f£ subs tantial 1 y mediate
coramni cation effects en attitude towards the advocacy object in
the Social Psychology literature (Cook 1969; Csterhcuse and Frock
197G; Inskc, Turnbull and Yandell 1974; Petty and Cacioppo 1977;
Cacioppo and Petty 1979) as well as in Marketing (Sterntbal
,
Dholakia and Leavitt 1978; Clscn, Toy and Dover 19 82). Fore
recently, pro/ccn thoughts targetted at the advertisement itself
have also been examined for their mediating effects en brand,
attitude and intention measures (Mackenzie and Lutz 19P2; Lutz
,
Mackenzie and Pelch 3 983; Batra and Fay 1983). However, severe]
other cognitive response types (e.g; curiosity thoughts, neutral
thoughts, unsupported brand evaluation thoughts) have recieved
virtually no attention in the literature. Little is known about
what these responses mean, or what role (if any) they play in the
persuasion process.
In this paper, ve focus on one such neglected cognitive
response catagory; namely, unsupported brand evaluation thoughts.
Brand evaluation thoughts (e.g; "I like this brand" , or "this is
a crummy brand") are frequently reported by subjects in
persuasion studies. Wright (1974, 1980) has argued that these
thoughts reflect attitude towards the advertised brand. Thus,
they should not be treated as mediators of post-exposure
attitude, since that would be tantamount to treating one measure
of attitude e.s a mediator of another. In particular, Wright
cautions against treating brand evaluation thoughts as instances
of counter and support argumentation. Fe suggests that C£ and S£
catacories should be restricted to thoughts that are tarcetted at
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a specific attribute/consequence of the adve rtisec brand, cr that
challenge the validity of a claim made in the advertisement
(V'right 1980, p. 153). Unfortunately, most persuasion researchers
have chosen, to include brand evaluation thoughts in their indices
of CA and SA (e.g; Cacioppo and Petty 1979; Petty and Cacioppc
1979, 1984; Petty, Cacioppo and Schuman 1983; Sternthal, Dholakia
and. Levitt 1978; Olson, Toy and Dover 1982; Patra and Pay 1983;
Belch 1981, 1982; Pethans, Swasy and Marks 1986; etc.).Mo
explicit raticnalle is ever given for adopting this procedure.
The practice seems to be governed by convenience rcther than, by
theoretical argument.
The treatment of brand evaluation thoughts in persuasion
research should clearly depend on an understanding of the
underlying states/processes that these thoughts indicate. If
they reflect a summary attitude judgment about the advertised
brand, then including these thoughts in CA and SA indices would
lead to biased and inflated ac cunts of cognitive response
mediation. However, if they capture some (as yet unspecified)
aspect of the attitude formation process, then it would be
desirable to treat them as potentially important mediators of
advertising impact on post-exposure attitude. Thus, the critical
issue is whether unsupported brand evaluation thoughts reflect or
mediate communication effects en the receiver. We know of no
empirical study in the Psychology or Marketing literature that
directly addresses this issue
HYFOTHESES
Two hypotheses are of research intrest in this study. Foth
_o
_3
are derived from Wright's (1974, 19F0) position on the meaning of
unsupported brand evaluation thougts in cognitive response
research
:
Fl: The presence of brand evaluation thoughts in a cognitive
response protocol indicates that the subject engaged in
attitude deleberation during the ad viewing episode. The
absence of any such thoughts indicates the absence of
attitude deliberation.
F2: Franc evaluation thoughts (when reported) directly indicate
post-exposure attitude towards the advertised brand.
To understand the logic underlying tests for Hi, assume that
subjects are exposed to an advertising message, and generate
counter and support arguments in response to the ed . Further
suppose that seme subjects (say, group 1) also integrate these
responses to form an overall evaluation of the advertised brand,
while other subjects (group 2) do net do so. Then, if all the
subjects asked to report their brand attitude seme tire after
exposure, group 1 subjects should simply retrieve their
preformulated attitude judgement from memory. Since this judgment
was based on message-induced counter and support arguments,
indices of CP/SP- should shew strong correlations with the
post-exposure attitude measures. In contrast, group 2 subjects
would need to construct a judgement in response to the
post-exposure attitude probe. These subjects may attempt to
retrieve counter and support arguments from lona term memory to
formulate an attitude judgement. Fowever, memcry for CZ/SP would
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almost certainly be incomplete. Furthermore, these subjects may
also retrieve some of the advertising content, and generate new
CA/SA to assist in their attitude deleberation. Thus, measures of
CA/S£ based on spontaneous thoughts produced during ad exposure
should show relatively weaker correlations vith post-exposure
attitude measures. Furthermore, subjects should evidence lower
levels of confidence in their attitude judgment (relative to
group 1 subjects) since the judgment is based on incomplete
memory. The preceeding discussion suggests that Pi could be
tested by comparing the strenqth of correlation between CA/SA
indices and brand attitude measures, and confidence in the
attitude responses for subjects who report brand, evaluation
thoughts with the corresponding correlations and confidence
measures for subjects who do net report any such thoughts.
F2 can be tested in several different ways. First, we could
construct a measure cf brand evaluation based on naturally
occur ir.g brand evaluation thoughts, and correlate it with
standard measures of pcst-exposur e attitude. Ve would then expect
these correlations to be quite high -- almost as high as the
intercor relations among the attitude measures, and substantially
higher than the correlations between indices cf C^/SA and
measures of post-exposure attitude. Second, we could examine the
partial correlations between CA/SA indices and post-exposure
attitude after the common variance between brand evaluation
thoughts and attitude has been statistically removed. If brand
evaluation thoughts truly measure attitude, then these
correlations should be small and nonsignificant. On the ether
hand, large and significant correlations would provide evidence
against E2.
There is a third way tc test the validity of F2. Suppose
that an experimental manipulation produoes strong, reliable
effects on brand attitude in an AFOVA model. If E2 is true, then
including brand evaluation thoughts as a ccvariate in the model
should, reduce these effects to nonsignificant levels. Eov/ever, if
significant residual effects remain, then brand evaluation
thoughts clearly do not capture all of the experimentally induced
variation in brand attitude. Thus, H2 is not supported.
Furthermore, if including indices of CA/SA as additional
covariates in the model leads tc further reduction in the
magnitude of treatment effects on brand attitude, then it is
likely that both CA/SA and brand evaluation responses are only
partially mediating message effects on attitude.
In sum, we propose to conduct multiple tests to examine the
validity of each of the hypothesis under investigation. The
intent is to provide convergent evidence that either supports or
disconfirms these hypotheses.
METHOD
Experimental Design
The data came from a larger study designed to test
alternative models of cognitive response mediation ir an
advertising context. Only relevant aspects of the design and
measurement procedures are reported here. The design was a 2
(product) by 2 (message quality) factorial. Tvo products (vhite
bread and ball point pen) vere used to examine product specific
differences. The message quality factor v:as designed to produce
large effects on post-exposure attitude, end thus provide an
opportunity for examining mediation effects due to CA/SA indices
and brand evaluation thoughts. Two versions of full color print
ads for each of the two products were created by a professional
artist. Both versions claimed that the advertised brand possessed
a desirable characteristic (nutritional quality for white bread,
consistency of ink flow for ball point pen) , but gave either
compelling or uncompelling reasons for accepting the claim (good
versus poor quality message). This type of a "message quality"
manipulation has been previously used by Petty and Cacioppo to
polarize post-exposure attitude (e.g; Petty and Cacioppo 1984).
Subjects and Procedure
Eighty student subjects tocl: part in the experiment in small
groups (group size never exceeded 8 ) f and were paid five dollars
for their participation. Subjects were exposed to five print ads
in all , and were given 45 seconds to view each ad. Three of
these were real ads and are of no concern in this study. Fach
subject viewed one aa version (containg either good., or poor
quality arguments) for each of the two experimental products.
The two experimental ads v/ere rotated in positions 2 and 4 in the
ed viewing sequence such that exactly half the subjects saw any
one product ad in any one location. The dc 1. viewing session was
unexpectedly interrupted after the fourth ad (either the bread or
the ren ad for exactly half the subjects), and cognitive
responses were obtained for this ad only. Subjects v/ere given
exactly three minutes to list all their thoughts in response to
the ad. The three minute time limit was judged adeauate based on
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pretest (fata. £fter viewing the fifth ad, subjects performed a
short (approximately ten minute) intervening task, and ther
completed a structured questionnaire which measured (among other
things ) their attitude and behavioral intention towards the two
experimental products. However, in this study we examine
attitude/intention data for each subject for one of the two
products only, i.e; the product for which the subject also
provided cognitive response measures. Three bi-polar seven-point
scales (good -bad, good quality-poor quality, like-dislike) were
used to measure attitude. Intention to purchase the brand was
measured on a single seven-point scale (not at all likely-very
likely). Level of confidence in attitude and intention judgments
was also measured on seven-point scales (not at all confident-
very confident).
One special feature of the experimental
.
procedure needs to
be explained further. Note that since tests of F2 are based only
on subjects who do report brand evaluation thoughts, one would
ideally like the size of this group of subjects to be as large as
possible. On the the ether hand, tests for Fl would have maximum
power if roughly equal number of subjects 60 versus do not report
brand evaluation thoughts. In either case, the worst scenario
would be one where only a small fraction of subjects
spontaneously report such thoughts. Unfortunately, previous
cognitive response studies show this to be the case. For
instance, only 4.& 96 of the subjects in the Olson, Toy and Dover
(1982) study reported brand, evaluation thoughts. This could, be
either because subjects did not engage in attitude deliberation,
or beaca.use the absence of brand evaluation thoughts does net
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indicate the absence of attitude deliberation. Fither way, the
implication is that extremely large sample sizes would be needed
to test Hi and B2. Given the exploratory nature of our study, we
decided to try an alternative approach. £11 subjects were given
brand evaluation instructions before they viewed the aCs . The
intent was to encourage attitude deleberaticn during the ad
viewing episode, and thus improve the quality of cur tests for H2
at the expense of Hi. Despite these instructions, however, only
35 of 80 subjects spontaneously reported brand evaluation
thoughts. Thus, we ended up with ideal group sizes for testing
Fl, and still had a reasonable sample of subjects for testing F2.
The implications of these orienting instructions are considered
in greater detail in the discussion section.
Cognitive Response Ceding
The cognitive responses were coded in two ways. First, each
subject identified all of his brand-related thoughts (whether
supported or unsupported) and rated each one on a seven-point
bipolar (positive-negative) scale. Next, two independent judges
coded these brand -related thoughts as either CR/SP (using
Wright's 1973 criteria), unsupported brand evaluation thoughts,
or other thoughts (e.g; curiosity thoughts). The judges agreed
on 92% of these classifications. Disagreements were resolved by
mutual discussion.
Two indices of cognitive response were developed from these
codings. First, the evaluation ratings fcr all counter end
support arguments were summed and divided by the total number of
counter and support arguments to yield an index cf CA/SA. Seccnc,
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an index for brand evaluation thoughts was constructed in a
similar manner. Foth indices could take en values between -3 and
+3 — exactly the same range as for the attitude and intention
measures
.
FESULTS
Tests for El
All subjects were first classified into two groups based on
the incidence of brand evaluation thoughts in their cognitive
response protocol. 35 of the 8C subjects (15 of 40 for white
bread, 20 of 40 for ball point pen) reported at] east one brand
evaluation thought -- these were assigned to group 1. The
remaining 45 subjects made up group 2. For group 1 subjects, the
partial correlation between the index of CA/SA and brand attitude
(represented by an average of the three rating scales) was .47.
The partial correlation betv-een tre index of CP/SP. and behavioral
intention measure was .35. These correlations were computed after
the effects of the two treatment factors on the correlated
variables had been statistically removed. The corresponding
correlations for group 2 subjects were .46 and .51 respectively.
Since the correlations for group 1 subjects are not larger than
the corresponding correlations for group 2 subjects, Hi is not
supported. Zero order correlations were consic erehly higher than
these partial correlations, but showed virtually the same pattern
Analyses of confidence measures also fail to support Hi.
There was virtually no difference between the two groups in the
mean confidence ratings for attitude (5.26 for group 1, 5.^7 for
grcup 2, 7=very confident) and behaviora] intentions (5.90 for
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grcuplr 6.07 for croup 2). In seperate three-way (product by
message quality by group) ANCVA with the two confidence measures
as the dependent variables, the croup factor failed to produce
significant main effects, and all interactions involving the
group factor were also ncnsigni fie ant (p>.2 in all cases).
Tests for H2
These tests are based en subjects who reported atleast one
brand evaluation thought in their verba] reports (i.e; croup 1
subjects, n=35) . Table 1 shows the witbin-cell correlations among
the two cognitive response indices and the three post-exposure
attitude scales. Note that the correlations among the attitude
scales are cuite high—generally around .75. Tn contrast, the
correlations between the index of brand evaluation thoughts and
these attitude scales are much smaller (between .50 and .5 5)
.
Also, the correlations between the index cf CA/SA and the
attitude scales are almost as high the correlations between the
index cf brand evaluation thoughts and these scales in tv/c of
three cases. Thus, F2 is not supported.
As a second test for K2, recall that the within-cell
correlations between the index cf CA/SA. and brand attitude
(averaged over the three scales) end intention measures for group
1 subjects were .47 and .35 respectively. When the common
variance betveen the index cf brand evaluation thoughts and these
attitude/intention measures is also partialed out, the
correlations crop to .38, and .29 respectively, but are still
statistically significant (p<.05). If H2 were true, then these
residual correlations would have teen cuite small and
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TABLE ]
FARTTAL CORRELATIONS AMONG COGNITIVE RESPONSE (CR)
INDICATORS AND PCST-EXFOSURE ATTITUDE MEASURES 5
CF Index for: Attitude Scales
Pr. Eval
.
good gd-pr like-
CA/SA Responses -bad cual . dislike
CR Index for:
CA/SA 1 .
Brand Eval . Responses
Attitude Scales
good -bad
good-poor quality
like-cisl ike
.31'
1.0
28
54
1.0
b
.54
.5 2
.44
.55
.69 .79
1.0 .72
1.0
,
a These are \vithin-cel3 correlations, n = 35.
b p<.05. All other correlations are significant at p<.Cl.
-12-
nonsignificant. Since tbi£ is clearly not the case, these
analyses also fail to substantiate H2.
Table 2 displays the results of our final test for H2. The
first rov< of the table shows that the message Quality factor
produced strong, significant effects on post-exposure attitude
and intention measures in a two-way (message quality by product)
ANCVA model. The product factor also produced significant (though
much smaller) effects en both dependent variables, but these are
net of interest here. The two-way interaction was nonsignificant
in both the cases (p>.15). Including the index of brand
evaluation thoughts as a covariate in the model lead to a
substantial (about 60%) reduction in the F-Patic for the message
quality effect. However, since the residual F-Fatics were still
highly significant, brand evaluation thoughts clearly did not
capture all of the treatment-induced variance in post-exposure
attitude and intention measures. Thus, F2 is net supported.
Furthermore, adding the CA/SA index as a second covariate in the
model resulted in further significant reductions in the F-Fatio
for the message guality effect (see Table 2, row 3). Pcth
covariates were statistically significant, and mediated over 60%
of the effects due to message guality variations on attitude and
intention measures. It would thus appear that counter/support
arguments and brand evaluation thoughts are both only partially
mediating message effects on attitude and behavioral intentions.
DISCUSSION
Taken in their entirity, our results c.o not support Wright's
(1974, 1T8C) position on the meaning of brand evaluation
-13-
TABLE 2
AFCOVA TESTS WITH ATTITUDE AFD IFT FIT IOF MEASURES
AS DFFEFDEFT VARIABLES, AFD INDICES OF
COGNITIVE FFSPOFSE AS COVARIATES. 3
F-Fatio for FesEace Quality Factor
Dependent Va r . : Dependent Var.
Attitude Feb. Intention
Covariate(s)
Fo Covariate 42. ?9 37.30
Index of Brand 16.57 14.62
Eval . Fesponses
Both the Indices- 7.87 7.63b
for Brand Fval
.
Fesponses and
CA/SA
Tbe design is a tv/c-v?ay • (message quality by product)
, factorial, n=35.
p<.05. All other effects significant at p<.01.
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thoughts, anc hence their role in the persuasion process. The
experiment reported in this paper provided multiple opportunities
for testing tv<o hypotheses that directly followed from Wright's
arguments. However, both hypotheses consistently failed to
receive support in any of the tests. Our results suggest that the
presence or absence of brand evaluation thoughts in a cognitive
response protocol may say very little about whether or not the
subject engaged in attitude deliberation as he/she viewed the
product advertisement. In all probability, a failure to report
brand evaluation thoughts may indicate just that—a reporting
bias. Thus, it would be inappropriate to use information on the
incidence of such thoughts to diagnose the underlying attitude
formation/change process. Furthermore, our results also suggest
that brand evaluation thoughts do not faithfully indicate
post-exposure attitude towards the advertised brand. Instead,
these thoughts seem to reflect seme aspect of the persuasion
process that is not fully captured in traditional measures of
counter/suppot argumentation. Thus, our results are not
inconsistent with the current practice of treating these thoughts
as mediators of message effects on attitude.
What Do Brand Evaluation Thoughts Mean?
In sum, our results provide seme indication of what brand
evaluation thoughts don't mean. However, there are several
alternatives to the hypothesized meanings of brand evaluation
thoughts that were examined in this study. For example, these
thoghts may reflect partial brand evaluations based on
immediately preceeding CA and/or SA. In other words, subjects may
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initially generate a few counter/support arguments, then elicit a
brand evaluation thought that captures the evaluative flavor of
these arguments, then report some new CA/SA, followed by another
summary judgement based on these, and so on. Second, brand
evaluation thoughts may capture the effects cf counter and
support arguments that are not reported during the thought
listing task. Possibly, brand evaluation thoughts provide
subjects with a simple alternative to an exhaustive reporting of
all CP/SA experienced during the ec viewing episode. Third, these
thoughts may reflect the effects cf non-brand characteristics
such as ad-execution or source attractiveness. In other words,
they may partially measure attitude towards the advertisement, cr
the ad sponsor.
Sorting out these competing explanations for the role cf
brand evaluation thoughts is likely to prove difficult. V*e may
need to begin examining the sequence in which various types of
cognitive responses are elicited, and the precise location of
brand evaluation thoughts vis-a-vis other types cf thoghts in
this sequence tc address these issues. For instance, if a single
brand evaluation thought is reported at the end cf a particular
cognitive response protocol, then it seems likely that this
thought reflects a terminal attitude judgment. On the other hand,
if these thoughts are interspersed at regular intervals
throughout the report, ther it is more likely that they indicate
a summary evaluation based en a subset of (stated cr unstated)
cognitive reactions to the advertisement. £lso, brand evaluation
thoughts that are produced in close proximity tc cognitive
responses targetted at the advertisement itself may capture ad
-16-
evaluation (as opposed to brand evaluation) processes. In slid, we
ere suggesting that multiple brand evaluation thoughts may have
different meanings for the same subject, and these meanings could
best be studied by examining cognitive response sequences rather
than simple frequency counts. Ofccurse, information on the
sequence of thoughts is only preserved if thought vearbal iza tion
measures are taken concurrently, not retrospectively as in the
present study. Although concurrent verbalization methods have
some problems (e.g; see Wright 1980) they may well provide the
key to developing an understanding of the precise role of brand
evaluation thoughts in the persuasion process.
Limitations
.
£11 subjects in our study were given brand evaluation
instructions before they viewed the experimental ads. The intent
was to heighten the likelihood of attitude deliberation during
the ec viewing episode, and thus? increase the incidence of
reported brand evaluation thoughts. Therefore, cur results are
probably net applicable to products and advertising messages
where subject involvement is lev. In the future, researchers may
wish to examine the role of brand evaluation thoughts under
relatively neutral (i.e; non-directive) instructions. We should
note, however/ that the low incidence of brand evaluation
thoughts in such contexts would neccessitate very large sample
s izes .
A second limitation of this study was that post-exposure
attitude measures were obtained a relatively short tire (about
ten to twenty minutes) after ad. exposure. This may have been
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too short a time interval to expect decay of information from
long tern memory for group 2 subjects. Note that both the tests
for Hi were based on the assumption that group 2 subjects would
need to base their attitude judgment en incomplete memory for
cognitive responses and/or message assertions. Longer time
intervals between the ad-viewing and attitude reporting tasks
would clearly allow for greater magnitudes of information loss
from memory, and thus allow for more powerful tests for F2. This
remains an emperical issue for future research.
-IP-
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